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RECENT DECISIONS
breach of a collective bargaining agreement? To date there have been
no adjudications on this point.16 This anomalous situation may be
explained, undoubtedly, in that equity offers the more adequate re-
lief.l7 In the case of Gull v. Barton, the court by way of dictum said:
"The agreement [collective bargaining] referred to was a valid con-
tract, which may be enforced in any proper manner." 18
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, unfor-
tunately, did not pass upon the validity of such an agreement, i.e., a
collective bargaining agreement containing a "strike clause". 19 By
holding that the complaint stated a good cause of action, it might be
inferred that the contract was not contrary to public policy and, there-
fore, the breach thereof would satisfy subdivision "a" of Section 876-a
of the Civil Practice Act.
B. B.
LIBEL-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-EFFEcT OF "REPUBLICA-
TION".-Plaintiff alleged that he was libeled by defendant in its pub-
lication of December 16, 1935. It was further alleged that defendant
"republished" the libel in March, 1937 by allowing a third party to
read copies of the newspaper kept on file in its offices. The present
action was commenced on May 7, 1937, more than one year after
the first publication but within the statutory period after the alleged
"republication". Held, two judges dissenting, action barred by Stat-
" Rice, op. cit. supra note 4, at 604.
'x See note 6, supra; see also Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221.
"a 164 App. Div. 293, 295, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952, 953 (3d Dept. 1914);
Keysaw v. Dotterweich, 121 App. Div. 58, 59, 105 N. Y. Supp. 562 (4th Dept.
1907) ; Stone Cleaning v. Russell, 38 Misc. 513, 515, 516, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1049,
1050 (1902), holding that the "plaintiff, if it has any cause of action, will have
an adequate remedy at law, just as would any other employee wrongfully dis-
charged. It will be possible for it [the union] to show the amount of services
of the time specified in the contract rendered to the defendant by others than
its members, and which its members might have rendered, and the consequent
damages, if any." (Italics ours.)
This case also determines the rights of the individual employees, who are
union members by virtue of a collective bargainiig agreement. Such employees
will be permitted to sue in' their own names under the beneficiary contract
theory, thereby repudiating the "agency" and "usage" theories. But cf. Lang-
made v. Olean Brewing Co., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. Supp. 388 (4th Dept.
1910), which accepted the "usage" theory by way of dicta. For a very able
study of this problem see Rice, loc. cit. supra note 4; see O'Keefe v. United
Ass'n of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1937). See WEITNEY,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 118 et seq. for discussion of beneficiary contracts.
Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905), holding that an action
will lie against an employer by a union on a note given as security "to be
applied as liquidated damages", if the collective bargaining agreement is violated
by the employer.
Instant case at 325, 18 N. E. (2d) at 295.
1939 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ute of Limitations 1 and motion to dismiss granted. In the publica-
tion of a defamatory artide in a newspaper there is but one publication,
and that at the time and place where the newspaper was first pub-
lished. Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspaper, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 640 (4th Dept. 1938).2
In the recent case of Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc.,3
the principle involved in the instant case was there passed upon.
Therein it was held that sales of issues of magazines containing alleged
libelous matter after the magazine had been originally placed on pub-
lic sale did not constitute a republication of such matter and that the
Statute of Limitations started to run from the date the magazine was
first placed on sale and not from the date of subsequent sales by
newsdealers.
The rule that owners and publishers of newspapers are liable for
the publication of libelous statements is so well settled, that it needs
no further discussion.4 It is also established law that each and every
publication gives rise to a separate cause of action in favor of the per-
son libeled 5 and it consequently follows that the Statute of Limitations
begins to run from the date of each publication.6 In the instant case
the question was presented whether allowing a stranger to read libel-
ous matter on a date after the newspaper was issued constituted a
"republication". A newspaper is printed on presses, and editions,
so called, are printed continuously. News in the first edition may be
dropped and new matter inserted in subsequent editions, but the same
libelous article may appear in more than one edition the same day.
It seems clear that where the defendant publishes the same libel in
two different papers owned by the same publishers, there are two dis-
tinct publications and, consequently, a like number of distinct causes
of action.7 But where the libelous matter appears on the same day
in different editions of the same paper (morning and evening edi-
tions), the cases are not clear as to the number of publications and
causes of action arising. That such appearances do not constitute
separate causes of action was decided in one case 8 and the broad
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 51, subd. 3.
'Aff'd, 279 N. Y. -, 18 N. E. (2d) 676 (1939).
'25 F. Supp. 993 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939).
"'It would be too much to say that any man might, with impunity, own
and sustain a public newspaper without any responsibility for the libels with
which it might abound." Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260 (N. Y. 1810).
'Cerro de Pasco Tunnel & Min. Co. v. Haggin, 106 App. Div. 401, 94 N. Y.
Supp. 593 (1st Dept. 1905); Fisher v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 144 App.
Div. 824, 100 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dept. 1906); Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn.
687, 27 S. W. 1008 (1894).
"A libel action is not barred where commenced within the statutory period
after the date the article was reissued or republished." Mack Miller Candle
Co. v. MacMillan Co., 239 App. Div. 738, 269 N. Y. Supp. 33 (4th Dept. 1934),
aff'd, 266 N. Y. 738, 195 N. E. 167 (1934).
'Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn. 687, 275 S. W. 1008 (1894); Cook v.
Connors, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78 (1915).
'Galligan v. Sun Printing and Pub. Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 54 N. Y. Supp
471 (1898).
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language of the court in that decision led a court 9 in another juris-
diction to venture the erroneous opinion that where the libel appeared
in the same paper on different days the repetition of the article prior
to bringing suit on the original article did not give rise to a new cause
of action. Thus according to the latter case, only where the repeti-
tion is made after the commencement of the action on the original
article will such a reiteration of the offensive matter give rise to a
new and distinct cause of action. That such holding is erroneous and
contrary to the weight of authority is unquestioned1 0 It has been
held that proof of the sale of one copy of a newspaper is proof of pub-
lication, yet it would be absurd to say that the defendant republishes
the article every time a copy is sold on the street.,- The great bulk
of newspapers is delivered to newsdealers, and the sales by them are
purely accidental and without premeditation. Although technically
each sale is a publication, any one sale satisfies the rule of proving
publication, and circulation merely proves the extent of the damages.'
2
It is therefore conceded that if the plaintiff had commenced this ac-
tion before the Statute of Limitations had expired, the scope of the
circulation and the preservation of the issue containing the article
would have been competent elements of damage by which the plain-
tiff's injury might have been measured;' 3 but the contention that a
new cause of action arose by virtue of the preservation of the article
cannot be sustained.
The legislature, in drafting the Statute of Limitations, had as
its object a purpose which it conceived to be imperative-to outlaw
stale claims-and in the interpretation of the Statute the spirit and
purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be con-
sidered.14  If the bar of the Statute could be lifted on the facts in
this case, the term of "statute of repose" could no longer be applied
to it, and the very purpose of the legislature would be defeated, and
the Statute of Limitations would never begin to run so long as there
was in existence a copy of the paper which was capable of being passed
about or sold.15
By way of conclusion, it has been stated that the test of whether
an article is a "republication" for which a separate cause of action
might be maintained, should not depend on an interval of time, or a
'Murray v. Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S. W. 1011 (1908).
10 Hearst v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 71 Misc. 7, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1089
(1911), aff'd, 144 App. Div. 896, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1126 (lst Dept. 1911);
Gordon v. Journal Pub. Co., 81 Vt. 237, 69 Atl. 742 (1908).
"Fried, Mendelson & Co. v. Halstea-d, Ltd., 203 App. Div. 113, 115, 196
N. Y. Supp. 285 (lst Dept. 1922) ; United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227 (D. C.
Ind. 1909).
'Logan v. Hodges, 146 N. C. 38, 59 S. E. 349 (1907) ; Randall v. Evening
News Ass'n, 79 Mich. 266, 44 N. W. 783 (1890).
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 39, 175 N. E. 505 (1931).
People v. Ryan, 274 N. Y. 149, 8 N. E. (2d) 313 (1937).
Julie B. Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., et al., 25 F. Supp. 993
(S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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separate sale, but upon whether or not the act of republication was a
conscious, independent one. The individual who sends the same let-
ter to different persons does so consciously and intentionally, so that
new causes of action would arise, whereas, in the case of a newspaper
no conscious intent arises unless and until it intentionally "repub-
lishes" the article. In each case it is the conscious act which deter-
mines.' Here there was nothing active on the part of the defendant.
Rather, its conduct would appear to be passive in character and does
not indicate a conscious intent to induce the public or any individual
to read the alleged libel. It was, at most, a gratuitous courtesy which
was extended only after a third party had made a request therefor.
F. D. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT--"LENT" SERVANT-INDEPENDENT CON-
TRAcToR-TESTS OF LIABILITY.-Defendant's predecessor assigned
part of his work of obtaining subscriptions for magazines to an inde-
pendent contractor. By a written contract the latter assumed the cost
and responsibility of transporting crews of young women to various
territories to carry on the work. An employee of defendant's pred-
ecessor was sent to the independent contractor as the said predeces-
sor's representative to go about with the crew and instruct them in
salesmanship. The independent contractor gave said employee a place
in his crew car on condition that he drive it. Plaintiffs were injured
because of this employee's negligent driving and brought this action
for personal injuries. Upon appeal from a judgment of the district
court dismissing the complaint, held, affirmed. Where the perfor-
mance of the contract of an independent contractor expressly includes
the work performed by a "lent" servant, the independent contractor
when he has control of such servant is the special employer and is
liable for his tortious acts.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior a master is liable for
the torts of his servant committed in the scope and course of his em-
ployment.' But where two alleged masters are involved, as where
the services of one's employee are utilized by an independent contrac-
tor, or where the servant is temporarily employed by a special master,
it is often difficult to determine which of the masters is liable. The
fact that the master sought to be charged paid the employee's wages,2
" SEELMAN, LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER (1933) § 130.
'Wylie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381 (1893) ; EDGAR AND EDGAR,
LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 76.
'Irolla v. City of New York, 155 Misc. 908, 280 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1935).
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